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I. INTRODUCTION

In an 1854 decision, Shields v. Barrow, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that those indispensable parties who must be joined in
pending litigation are remarkably defined as those “who not only have an
interest in the controversy, but an interest of such a nature that a final
decree cannot be made without either affecting that interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final termination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience.” 1 Even though Rule 19 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only partially echoes this definition,2
this article begins by drawing on this statement since it represents one of
the most exciting issues for in-depth investigation. 3 The primary goal of
this article is to isolate the components of a court’s decision on whether a
Rule 19 motion should be granted and to study their interrelated functions.
That analysis yields two conclusions. First, the court’s power to determine
whether to continue the litigation without the person who should be joined
or to dismiss the action because a party cannot be joined is too
discretionary. The second conclusion lays the groundwork for reframing
the court’s discretion as a means of avoiding repetitive litigation,
inconsistent judicial decisions, and impairment of absent persons as well
as those already before the court.
The article’s second aim is to answer classic and traditional questions
concerning the required joinder of parties through the lens of comparative
analysis. Such analysis provides needed assistance in formulating a
doctrine that is intended to rationalize and reduce the court’s discretion in
applying the standards of Rule 19. In particular, the consideration of the
Italian and German legal systems allows us to reframe the requirements
set forth by Rule 19(b). Comparative analysis suggests reducing judicial
discretion in deciding whether or not an absent person should be joined in
pending litigation. The European legal rules are narrowly crafted in order
to authorize the required joinder of parties only when the interest of the
absent person is deeply embedded in the factual specificities of the case.
1. See Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. 130, 139 (1855).
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19; see also infra Part I.
3. The distinction between necessary and indispensable parties depends on the fact that the
latter category refers to those parties whose joinder is always compelled, even at the dismissing action,
and traditionally represents a classic framework for the compulsory joinder of parties in the
introductions of several textbooks. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KANE & ARTHUR
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 342 (5th ed. 2015).
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Indeed, the early definition of indispensable parties implied by the
holding of Shields 4 reflects the early distinction between necessary and
indispensable parties within the context of compulsory joinder of parties. 5
Such a distinction is particularly amenable to comparative analysis
because it encourages civil lawyers to compare the civil law legal
tradition—that is, its academic literature and jurisprudence—with the
American tradition. In particular, the occasion for a comparative analysis
based on the civil law legal rules derives from the consideration that
“[d]etermining whether a party is indispensable requires the careful
exercise of judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis.” 6 Civil law
countries share a similar discretionary attitude toward the question of
whether the court should dismiss the case or continue without the person
who arguably should be joined. Nevertheless, such discretion is exercised
as a matter of legal requirement rather than legal interpretation. As further
discussed below, in civil law countries the theoretical and doctrinal
framework restricts the court’s substantial discretion more than the
regulatory regimes seem to dictate.
This article provides neither a reason for categorizing the existing
doctrine of compulsory joinder of parties nor a reason for redefining it
across the common law and civil law legal systems. To the contrary, the
article aims to join the debate regarding the appropriate level of discretion
when the court decides whether to continue the suit or dismiss it in the
necessary party context. The article is also aimed at determining whether
the debate about the court’s discretion to decide when a party to a
litigation is “indispensable” can be critically reviewed from the broad and
far-reaching view offered by the comparative legal analysis. In fact, the
comparison between civil law and common law legal systems may
provide fodder for the interpretation of the domestic rule, despite the
traditional limit in such a comparative evaluation concerning the

4. See John W. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327,
340 (1957). See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a
Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1961); Howard P. Fink, Indispensable Parties and
the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 403 (1965); Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the
Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REV. 745, 749 (1987); Robert G. Bone, Mapping
the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the
Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1989).
5. See Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204–05
(1966); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 361–62 (1967). See also Brandon R. Coyle, The
Proper Standard of Review for Required Party Determinations Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117, 1121–27 (2015).
6. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 3, at 348.
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meaningful and enduring differences between the two legal traditions. 7 In
particular, the article aims at suggesting that discretion should be guided
by fundamental principles that drive the European application of the law
on compulsory multiparty litigation. These principles are respect for the
Due Process Clause, in terms of the right to be heard, on the one side and
the purpose to avoid separate litigations between some indispensable
parties on the other.
There is no doubt that the structural differences between common
law and civil law legal systems on procedural matters might leave legal
scholars sitting on the fence. Nevertheless, the differences in the
regulatory regimes of joinder of parties as well as other procedural
matters 8 make the issue of judicial discretion largely a question of
properly balancing opposing policies—that is, the consistency and
adequacy of judicial decisions versus the reasonable length of civil
proceedings. On the one hand, the decision to continue the litigation
without the person who should be joined or to dismiss the action because
the party cannot be joined must be governed, respectively, by the harmful
consequences of inconsistent judgments and the risk of individual
impairment. On the other hand, the court’s decision can be affected by the
implications of joining an additional party in the proceedings on grounds
of the time that is necessary for the court to decide the case.
Thus, while legal scholars and practitioners have gradually
developed the historical distinction in Shields to satisfy the demand for
consistency that the American legal system properly makes upon its
judges, it is worth providing an additional view based on the comparative
analysis of law. Such an analysis may offer some notable support for
rethinking the most difficult issues in a Rule 19 motion. In particular, the
comparative analysis of law raises thorny questions relating to the manner
in which the court should exercise its discretionary power to determine
whether to continue the litigation without the person who should be joined
or to dismiss the action because the party cannot be joined under Rule
19(b). 9 From this comparative analysis, we determined discretion should
7. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives into the First
Year Civil Procedure Curriculum, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479 (2006); Kevin M. Clermont, Integrating
Transnational Perspectives into Civil Procedure: What Not to Teach, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524 (2006).
See also Joachim Zekoll, Comparative Civil Procedure, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1306, 1307 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2nd ed. 2019)
(stating that “comparative research in procedural areas is still at a relatively early stage”); Scott
Dodson, The Challenge of Comparative Civil Procedure, 60 ALA. L. REV. 133 (2008).
8. See Cesare Cavallini & Marcello Gaboardi, How to Reduce the Gap? A Comparative View
on the Policies Behind the Intervention Rules, REV. LITIG. (forthcoming Winter 2020).
9. See infra Part I.
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be driven by the twofold fundamental principles which drive the European
application of the law on compulsory multiparty litigation. First,
answering the question of whether or not a person should be joined
depends in part on the fact that the law protects the right to be heard in
favor of all persons substantially interested in pending litigation. Second,
an indispensable party is certainly a person substantially interested in
pending litigation, and therefore must be entitled to take part in the
proceedings to avoid the intricacies of separated litigations on the same
matter.
This article proceeds in five stages. Part I explains how the notion of
indispensable parties has become a crucial, as well as troubling, issue in
compulsory joinder of parties in the United States. Part II approaches the
sensitive and difficult task of determining whether the principle, the
inherent rules, and the policies of the compulsory joinder of parties under
the European laws suggest a new theory of interpretation that helps to find
a less discretionary solution to the puzzle of the “interest” required by
Rule 19. 10 Part III adds precision by examining the boundaries of joinder
of parties in Italian and German legal systems. At the center of this Part is
the question of how civil law legal systems (1) place the concept of
indispensable parties into the realm of civil litigation and (2) regulate the
judicial power to dismiss the action between the original parties. Having
provided a descriptive account of the scope of required joinder of parties
in the most representative civil law legal traditions, this article turns in
Part IV to evaluate judicial discretion under Rule 19(b) and compare it
with the more restrictive approach emerging from civil law tradition.
The Conclusion outlines the differences and similarities between the
legal systems at issue. In particular, it evidences that Italy, Germany, and
the United States have a great deal in common in that they need to reduce
judicial discretion used to decide whether or not a party is indispensable,
thus facilitating cross-border legal comparisons on such a procedural
matter.
II. THE COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES
The inquiry into the indispensability of parties is essentially a
question of how legal systems address fundamental issues concerning the
joinder of parties. The factors that drive this analysis in the United States

10.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1).
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are largely based on Rule 19. Therefore, it is worth taking a moment to
examine the underlying theories that Rule 19 reflect.
A.

Rule 19: An Overview

Rule 19(a) describes when a court is required to order the joinder of
a person who is not a party to the case.11 If the court decides a person
should be joined, the court must then evaluate whether the person can be
joined under principles of jurisdiction and venue. 12 If joinder is not
feasible because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal
jurisdiction, or venue, Rule 19(b) provides the factors that the court must
evaluate to decide between dismissing the case or continuing without the
person who should be joined. 13
Rule 19(a) makes it feasible for the court to order the joinder of
persons who should be parties when their absence impedes the court’s
ability to provide justice for those already parties or damages the nonparties. Whether or not a party is necessary or indispensable can be
described as a “fact-specific” question, 14 that usually arises when the
claimant has not joined everyone potentially affected by the claim and the
defendant files a motion to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(7)—that
is, for failure to join a person who should be a party. 15 The court is
empowered to order joinder of parties and deny a motion to dismiss when
complete relief cannot be granted in the absence of indispensable parties
because their interest in the litigation makes it practically or legally
harmful to proceed without them. 16 The court, faced with a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7), will look first to the standards of Rule 19(a)
to consider whether the court may join necessary parties. Three
alternatives exist: (1) the court may order the joinder of an absentee party,
a person who is not yet a party to the case when her absence impedes the

11. See id.
12. See id.; see also id. 19(a)(3).
13. See id. 19(b).
14. See United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1996). See
also Gonzales v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 174 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Whether a party is
necessary and indispensable is a pragmatic and equitable judgment, not a jurisdictional one.”).
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(7). See also HS Res., Inc. v. Wingate, 327 F.3d 432, 438–39 (5th
Cir. 2003).
16. See generally Hammond v. Clayton, 83 F.3d 191, 195 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Rule 19 is designed
to protect the interests of absent persons, as well as those already before the court, from duplicative
litigation, inconsistent judicial determinations, or other practical impairment of their legal interests.”);
CP Nat’l Corp. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 928 F.2d 905, 911 (9th Cir. 1991).
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court from granting “complete relief” to the existing parties; 17 (2) the
court may order the absentee party joined even when her interest in the
dispute may be impaired either practically or legally; 18 and (3) the court
may order the absentee party joined in order to mitigate the “risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations” when
several persons have overlapping interests in a party’s property. 19
The court is asked to conduct a two-step assessment. While the first
step is entirely based on the standards of Rule 19(a), the second step
requires the court that found the joinder of parties essential to the case 20
to determine whether the Rule 19(b) factors make dismissal appropriate. 21
To guide the inquiry into whether a person who should be joined cannot
actually be joined because the joinder would defeat jurisdiction or venue,
Rule 19(b) enumerates an array of factors that must be considered as “not
exhaustive” 22 because additional factors can be important in particular
cases. 23
The court must weigh the four factors listed in Rule 19(b) as a
whole. 24 The first factor requires the court to determine whether legally
or practically troubling consequences may result by proceeding without
the person qualifying for joinder under Rule 19(a). 25 The consequences of
proceeding without such a person must be evaluated, taking into account
both the interest of persons already parties and the interest of persons not

17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(A). See, e.g., Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas
Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In conducting the Rule 19(a)(1) analysis, the court
asks whether the absence of the party would preclude the district court from fashioning meaningful
relief as between the parties.”); Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Norton, 248 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir.
2001).
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). See., e.g., Davis v. United States, 192 F.3d 951, 958
(10th Cir. 1999) (“Rule 19, by its plain language, does not require the absent party to actually possess
an interest; it only requires the movant to show that the absent party ‘claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action.’”); Torcise v. Cmty Bank (In re Torcise), 116 F.3d 860, 865 (11th Cir. 1997);
Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1992) (Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i) excludes those
claimed interests that are “patently frivolous”).
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). See, e.g., Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric.
Improvement & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2002) (action to set aside lease or
contract threatens non-party’s interest in lease, thereby raising Rule 19(a)(2)), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
820 (2002); Harris Tr.& Sav. Bank v. Energy Assets Int’l Corp., 124 F.R.D. 115, 117 (E.D. La. 1989)
(“[W]here interpretation of a contract is involved, parties to that contract must be joined.”).
20. See, e.g., Snap-on Tools Corp. v. Mason, 18 F.3d 1261, 1267 (5th Cir. 1994).
21. See, e.g., HS Res., Inc. v. Wingate, 327 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2003).
22. Cf. Gardiner v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 145 F.3d 635, 640 (3d Cir. 1998). See also
Rhone-Poulenc Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Rule 19(b) sets forth a
standard, not a rigid rule.”).
23. See Davis, 192 F.3d at 960.
24. See Delgado v. Plaza Las Ams, Inc., 139 F.3d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 1998).
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)(1).
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joined. While those who are already parties may be damaged by the risk
of inconsistent judgments if the absent person is not joined, those who are
not yet parties may be damaged by the risk of collateral estoppel because
their interests are affected, possibly significantly, by the outcome of the
case. 26 According to the second factor under Rule 19(b), the court is asked
to examine whether the decision to refuse joinder can occur without
significant damage to those who are already parties and to non-parties
because means for reducing potential damages exist and are available to
the court. 27
While these two factors revolve around the adverse implications of
refusing to join a person who should be joined, the other two factors
depend on the adequacy of a judgment rendered in such a person’s
absence and the availability of another forum in which the claimant can
sue both the existing defendant(s) and the person(s) who cannot be joined.
In particular, the judgment is considered adequate and in the public
interest when it ensures an efficient and conclusive decision of the legal
dispute. 28 The judgment must be final, thus it can be considered
inadequate when it leaves related claims by (or against) the absent person
partially or fully undecided. 29 Similarly, the court is asked to decide
whether another forum is available in which to sue both the person who
cannot be joined as well as those already parties in the case. If another
forum is not available, it means that the claimant cannot have an adequate
remedy “if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.” 30 In this case, the
court generally proceeds with the action. 31
B.

The Historical Path of Rule 19(b)

Having provided a rough sketch of the American legal framework, it
is useful to inquire into the court’s discretion under Rule 19(b) by
examining three crucial factors. In so doing, we move from the American
historical development of Rule 19 to how it is relevant for the civil law
statutory regulations and their interpretations. Those factors are (1) the
26. See, e.g., Estate of Alvarez v. Donaldson Co., 213 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2000); Schulman v.
J.P. Morgan Inv. Mgmt., Inc., 35 F.3d 799, 806 (3d Cir. 1994).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)(2). See also Laker Airways, Inc., v. British Airways, PLC, 182
F.3d 843, 849 (11th Cir. 1999).
28. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)(3).
29. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968)
(emphasizing “the interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement
of controversies” under Rule 19(b)).
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)(4).
31. See Donaldson, 213 F.3d at 995; see also Angst v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d
701, 706 (3d Cir. 1996).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss1/2

8

Cavallini and Gaboardi: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Too Discretionary

2020]

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TOO DISCRETIONARY

47

reason why the distinction implied by the holding in Shields 32 led to the
introduction of Rule 19 in 1938; (2) how the Advisory Committee
amended this rule in 1966; and (3) the issues the current rule still raises.
The first factor has been developed by American legal literature. The
holding of Shields is considered the main step to understanding the
provision of Rule 19 and its debatable interpretation and application by
the courts.
Necessary and indispensable parties was rigidly applied by the
courts, since it led judges to the so-called “jurisprudence of labels” or
“sloganeering process.” 33 What do these words mean? Moreover, why
were these words considered harmful and described as having an
“unhappy history”? 34 The answer unexpectedly seems quite easy and
clear, particularly coming from a civil law perspective. Necessary and
indispensable are very similar qualifications of parties. They tend to get
confused in the eyes of the judge because they do not clearly distinguish
the two different roles that the parties can play in the proceedings. They
simply suggest the parties’ involvement in the proceedings is essential to
adjudicating the case. A party can be depicted as necessary to the
proceedings in the same cases in which she can be qualified as
indispensable. Efforts to distinguish these two nuances only produce
empty classifications that can be filled with any discretionary meanings.
Such an answer opens, however, the door to a partially different
evaluation.
Criticism of the Shields’ distinction strictly depends on the abstract
way of reasoning by the courts after Shields. In particular, the decisions
on the compulsory joinder of parties before 1938—when the first version
of Rule 19 was written—were usually focused on a general definition of
the interest that affected the joinder of multiple parties. That interest was
defined as “joint,” “common,” or “united” in accordance with the nature
of the right involved in the lawsuit. 35 As noted above, this legal reasoning
was ultimately considered too abstract and rigid because courts did not
consider the consequences to the supposed indispensable parties. In other
terms, the courts should have encouraged the dismissal of action
whenever indispensable parties were not joined, 36 even though the courts
ascertained the “joint interest” case by case in light of the peculiar
32. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. 130 (1854).
33. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 362; see also Tobias, supra note 4, at 749 and Coyle, supra
note 5, at 1122.
34. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 3, at 343.
35. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 362.
36. Id.; see also Coyle, supra note 5, at 1122.
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characteristics of the facts and the rights involved in the lawsuit. 37 In
reality, courts were often reluctant to dismiss the action whenever the
indispensable party could not be joined. This reluctance resulted from the
fact that resolving the issues on the merits required time and expense that
would have been wasted if the action had been dismissed. It has, thus,
been noted that under the original version of Rule 19—written in 1938—
a conflict hid within the judge’s determinations. 38 On the one hand, courts
often recognized the “joint interest” of the parties as creating
indispensable parties; on the other hand, when the indispensable party was
recognized, the dismissal of the action was at odds with the natural task
to resolve disputes on the merits.
As we will see below, this kind of conflict encompasses the essence
of the compulsory joinder of parties and, therefore, might also be
investigated from a comparative perspective. Despite the differences
between common law and civil law legal traditions, the essence of a
required joinder of parties is similar for both legal systems. Therefore, it
seems to us crucial, at this point, to understand how the amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure approved in 1966 significantly
changed Rule 19.
C.

Towards the Court’s Discretionary Power: The Pimentel Case

As written in 1938, Rule 19 failed in its scope. 39 This conclusion was
clearly stated in the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 1966
amendments to Rule 19. 40 It is worth noting that the balance of the new
rule moved toward considering the consequences of the recognized
indispensable parties to the lawsuit in terms of potential dismissal of the
action that was brought between the original parties.
The amended rule revolves around twofold guidance. On the one
hand, the main issue involved in the rule is the feasibility of the
compulsory joinder of a “required party.” In theory, when a party
is required to join in pending litigation—that is, when a party should be
joined—the compulsory joinder of that party would always be feasible.

37. See, e.g., Note, Indispensable Parties in the Federal Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1050
(1952).
38. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 3, at 344 nn.164–65.
39. See Katherine Florey, Making Sovereigns Indispensable: Pimentel and the Evolution of
Rule 19, 58 UCLA L. REV. 667 (2011); Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363; Tobias, supra note 4, at 750;
Hazard, supra note 4, at 1258; Fleming James, Necessary and Indispensable Parties, 18 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 68 (1963).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment § (2), 39 F.R.D. 69, 90
(1966) (hereinafter “Advisory Note”).
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However, courts cannot exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over all
parties. In other words, subject-matter jurisdiction is the key to feasibility.
Indeed, a common jurisdiction is the answer to solving the compulsory
joinder of parties.
On the other hand, if the precondition of the compulsory joinder of
the parties is the jurisdiction, it is not relevant when the parties who should
be joined are indispensable. While Rule 19(a) requires the so-called
“three-step process” 41 to determine the parties to be joined, Rule 19(b)
provides the feasibility for the compulsory joinder of parties. Therefore,
the new rule gives up the old, rigid provisions on compulsory joinder of
parties, even though it indirectly promotes this interpretation. In fact,
beyond the feasibility or infeasibility of the compulsory joinder of parties,
what allows the court to qualify the joinder of parties as compulsory is
exclusively the notion of indispensable parties. So, the court has exclusive
discretion to determine whether or not a party is indispensable on a caseby-case basis “in equity and good conscience.” 42
The amended rule suggests a case-by-case approach to the
consequences of the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. The
discretionary power of the court allows it to pragmatically determine if
the parties are indispensable. In so doing, the court decides what action to
take. Once again, however, the lack of jurisdiction emerges as the
mainstay of the compulsory joinder of parties. The required joinder of
parties cannot change the court’s jurisdictional authority, which is the
main reason why the judicial decision to join a non-party in pending
litigation can be considered feasible or infeasible. 43
Having discussed the history of Rule 19, we now address the ongoing
issues and analyze the factors that should guide the judge in considering
if a person should be joined in existing litigation under Rule 19(b).
We begin by analyzing the statement of the Supreme Court in
Philippines v. Pimentel with respect to the judge’s decision regarding
41. See Coyle, supra note 5, at 1123.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). See Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S.
102, 118–19 (1968) (“Whether a person is ‘indispensable,’ that is, whether a particular lawsuit must
be dismissed in the absence of that person, can only be determined in the context of particular
litigation. . . . The decision whether to dismiss . . . must be based on factors varying with the different
cases, some such factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by themselves, and
some subject to balancing against opposing interests.” (footnote omitted)); Niles-Bement Co. v. Iron
Moulders’ Union, Local No. 68, 254 U.S. 77, 80 (1920) (“There is no prescribed formula for
determining in every case whether a person . . . is an indispensable party or not.”). See also Florey,
supra note 39, at 677–78; Coyle, supra note 5, at 1127–28.
43. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 3, at 347. The lack of jurisdiction may
occur whenever: (1) there is no personal jurisdiction over the non-party to join; (2) there is no subjectmatter jurisdiction of the court; (3) there is a valid objection by the non-party to compulsory be joined.
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“equity and good conscience” under Rule 19(b). 44 First, the Court noted
that “[t]he design of the Rule . . . indicates that the determination whether
to proceed will turn upon factors that are case specific, which is consistent
with a Rule based on equitable considerations.” 45
This statement reveals the tendency of the Court to favor a
discretionary judicial power. This conclusion also stems from the socalled pragmatic approach of the Court. According to this approach, the
judge is asked to evaluate if:
the fact that the determination of who may, or must, be parties to a suit
has consequences for the persons and entities affected by the judgment;
for the judicial system and its interest in the integrity of its processes and
the respect accorded to its decrees; and for society and its concern for
the fair and prompt resolution of disputes. 46

This conclusion has become part of the mainstream view of Rule
19(b). Thus, cases involving compulsory joinder of parties raise recurring
issues not present in traditional, bilateral litigation. The first issue
concerns the potential conflict between the interests of those original
parties who can be damaged if other persons should be joined but are not,
and the interests of those absent parties who can be harmed by the final
judgment if they are joined. 47 Therein also lies a second important issue.
In Pimentel, the Supreme Court noted that the compulsory joinder of
parties can be considered as a necessary means of avoiding the risk of the
defendant being exposed to multiple and fragmented adjudications. 48 This
risk could, in some cases, be considered a breach of the Due Process
Clause, since it exposes the absent party to multiple liability payments
upon the same obligation.
To summarize, the rationale of Rule 19 as amended in 1966 can be
described in terms of “what harm may accrue if party joinder is not
ordered, rather than what policies should be satisfied through joinder.” 49
Phrased in these terms, Rule 19 clearly shows the reason for the judge’s
discretionary power in determining whether a party is indispensable and
must be joined. It also leads to coherent identification of the main
consequence of the infeasible joinder of parties which is the judicial order
to dismiss the action.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
5, at 368.
49.

See Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851 (2008).
Id. at 862.
Id. at 863.
See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 3, at 343–45.
See W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961). See also Kaplan, supra note
Cf. FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 3, at 345.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss1/2

12

Cavallini and Gaboardi: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Too Discretionary

2020]

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TOO DISCRETIONARY

51

It is also worth reviewing the factors that guide the court in
determining whether the person who should be joined is indispensable
under Rule 19(b). In particular, employing the lens of comparative
analysis reveals that the four standards established in Rule 19(b) 50 require
the court to evaluate the motion to dismiss the action on a case-by-case
basis. These four standards appear heterogeneous and allow the court to
decide the case in “good conscience.” 51 Nevertheless, such a discretionary
power can be an obstacle to the systematic background of the compulsory
joinder of parties particularly when the non-parties are indispensable.
D.

Indispensable Parties and the Standard of Review

As noted above, the required joinder of parties involves the judicial
evaluation of whether a non-party should be considered as necessary or
indispensable. The answer to this question derives from the discretionary
evaluation under Rule 19(b), in which the court must decide whether “in
equity and good conscience” the case may be continued among the
existing parties or whether the case must be dismissed because the
absentee party cannot be joined. 52 The substantial discretion of the district
courts in deciding whether a non-party is necessary or indispensable is
compounded by the standard of review of the majority of circuits. The
decisions of courts of appeals emphasize the required joinder of parties as
an instrument for achieving the uniformity and predictability of the law.
Different ways of interpreting non-parties as necessary or indispensable
result in different ways of applying Rule 19(b).
If the court determines in its Rule 19(b) analysis, that the action
should be dismissed, the absent person is thus regarded as indispensable.
The court considers a non-party who should be joined under Rule 19(a)
as an indispensable party only if the court’s discretionary decision is to
dismiss the case so it may not be continued between only the original
parties.
The standard of review applied to the district court’s discretionary
evaluation under Rule 19(b) will often be “outcome determinative,” since
an abuse of discretion standard will most often permit the district court’s
decision to stand, while a de novo review will allow for much more
frequent appellate oversight. 53 Courts have debated whether the Rule
50. See supra Part I.
51. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
52. See supra Part I.
53. See Peter Nicolas, De Novo Review in Deferential Robes?: A Deconstruction of the
Standard of Review of Evidentiary Errors in the Federal System, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 531
(2004) (footnote omitted) (quoting Kearney v. Standard Ins., Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir.
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19(b) decision should be subject to de novo review or abuse of discretion
review. The Supreme Court has not yet provided a clear statement on the
matter. 54 While the majority of the courts of appeals use the abuse of
discretion standard, given that the courts are making fact-based,
discretionary decisions based on equitable factors, 55 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals uses de novo review. 56
The reason for this unbalanced debate, with more circuits favoring
the abuse of discretion review, is understandable. Since Rule 19(b)
“requires the district court to analyze various equitable considerations
within the context of particular litigation, rather than to decide a purely
legal issue,” 57 the courts would generally use the abuse of discretion
standard. 58
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals uses the de
novo standard of review. 59 The main reason for its opposite position is that
it views the determination of whether a party is indispensable as
“represent[ing] a legal conclusion reached after balancing the prescribed
factors under Rule 19[(b)].” 60 Accordingly, this issue is considered an
issue of law “which the court reviews de novo.” 61

1999)) (noting that the standard of review “is often ‘outcome determinative,’ in the sense that the
difference between victory and defeat on appeal can turn on whether the standard by which the
appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision on an issue is plenary or deferential.” ); Coyle, supra
note 5, at 1132.
54. See Coyle, supra note 5, at 1138–40.
55. See Walsh v. Centeio, 692 F.2d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Picciotto v. Cont’l
Cas. Co., 512 F.3d 9, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2008); Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 132 (2d
Cir. 2013); Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 403 (3d Cir. 1993);
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Rite Aid of S.C., Inc., 210 F.3d 246, 250–54 (4th Cir.
2000); Hood ex rel. Miss. v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 632–33 (5th Cir. 2009); Extra
Equipamentos e Exportação Ltda. v. Case Corp., 361 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2004); Scenic Holding,
LLC v. New Bd. of Trs. of Tabernacle Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., 506 F.3d 656, 665 (8th Cir.
2007); Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002); N. Arapaho Tribe
v. Harnsberger, 697 F.3d 1272, 1277 (10th Cir. 2012); Laker Airways, Inc. v. British Airways, PLC,
182 F.3d 843, 847 (11th Cir. 1999); Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1495 (D.C.
Cir. 1995).
56. See Local 670, United Rubber v. Int’l Union, United Rubber, 822 F.2d 613, 619 (6th Cir.
1987); see also Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty.v. Michigan, 11 F.3d 1341, 1346 (6th Cir. 1993).
57. See Walsh, 692 F.2d at 1242.
58. See, e.g., Cloverleaf Standardbred Owners Ass’n v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., 699 F.2d 1274
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
59. See Local 670, 822 F.2d at 619.
60. Id.
61. Id. See also Keweenaw, 11 F.3d at 1346 (“[W]e made clear that the distinct indispensability
analysis under rule 19(b) is inherently a legal question.”). This conclusion has been feebly considered,
although it is within the abuse of discretion review standard, which is also used by the Seventh Circuit;
see also Sokaogon Chippewa Cmty. v. Wisconsin, 879 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1989) (“It can be
argued that the finding of indispensability is so fell in its consequences, requiring as it does the
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Pierce v. Underwood enumerated several factors for choosing the
appropriate standard of review. 62 In particular, Underwood focused on the
use of general factors that guide the choice between the two standards.
Underwood concluded, as the Supreme Court also concluded in Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx, that the “abuse of discretion” review is appropriate
when the decision of a district court is based on “issues rooted in factual
determinations” as well as in the “reasonableness under the
circumstances.” 63
Most of the courts of appeals have also so concluded in the Rule
19(b) context. As in Walsh v. Centeio, 64 the analysis of the appropriate
standard of review for Rule 19(b) issues has focused mainly on the
language of the rule and its required conclusion based on a non-exhaustive
list of equitable factors. Moreover, the decisions of the courts of appeals
have highlighted the relationship between Rule 19’s history (until the
1966 amendment) and its current discretionary and pragmatic evaluation
of the material facts, instead of the abstract characterization of the nature
of rights and obligations involved in the lawsuit. Because the decision of
whether to proceed with an action when the joinder of a required party is
infeasible may lead to dismissal of the action, the reviewing court should
be more deferential to the district court’s discretionary power. 65 Even if
dismissals for failure to join a person who should be a party involve legal
issues, such as inducing the claimant to bring a lawsuit in his own forum
or damaging the defendant by continuing the litigation, the de
novo review must only apply to the compulsory joinder of parties
regardless of whether it is feasible or not. In contrast, if the decision on
the dismissal of the action depends on a “fact-dependent legal standard,” 66
appellate courts use the abuse of discretion standard.
E.

Rationale Behind Rule 19(b)

While the original Rule 19 conclusion that a party was an
indispensable party provided for the automatic dismissal of the action, the
court now defines the potential party as indispensable only after it has

dismissal of the entire suit, that the appellant should receive a broader scope of review.”). It is worth
noting that the Seventh Circuit holds a similar conclusion although it has been more nuanced. See
Pasco Int’l (London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 505–06 (7th Cir. 1980).
62. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557–64 (1988).
63. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401–02 (1990). See also Underwood,
487 U.S. at 559.
64. See Walsh v. Centeio, 692 F.2d 1239, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 1982).
65. See Coyle, supra note 5, at 1146–49.
66. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 402.
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already concluded that it is inappropriate to decide the case in her absence.
Rule 19(b) provides that once it is established which party is required to
be joined but that joinder is not possible because of jurisdictional or venue
obstacles, the discretionary power of the court is implemented when
deciding whether or not the pending litigation must be dismissed or may
proceed in the absence of the required party. 67 The courts are empowered
to refer to non-exhaustive considerations and make the decision based on
further considerations of “equity and good conscience.” 68
Moreover, it is relevant for the following comparative analysis to
underline two considerations. The first one emerges from the nature of the
factors generally related to the court’s determination of whether the action
must be dismissed or may proceed without the absentee/required party.
Whether one observes the four factors established by Rule 19(b)
singularly or as a whole, the outcome is the same: the factors are related
to the effectiveness and the efficiency of the decision rendered in the
absence of the parties who were required to be joined if feasible.
Second, even though the trial courts possess a discretionary power to
determine whether the case will proceed without the party to be joined if
feasible, it seems less relevant to argue about whether the decision is
wrongful. This consideration indirectly finds justification in the decision
by the majority of courts of appeals to review a Rule 19(b) decision under
the deferential abuse of discretion standard. In other words, even
assuming that the abuse of discretion permits overturning a Rule 19(b)
decision rendered “in equity and good conscience,” in some instances,
reversal would represent less a conclusion that the trial court’s decision

67.
68.

See supra Part I.C. for a discussion on the non-exhaustive criteria under Rule 19(b).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
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was an erroneous judgment on the merits 69 than a factual conclusion based
on a pragmatic decision of the appeals court.70
These considerations open the door to a very fascinating comparative
evaluation within the civil law legal systems. A civil lawyer is thus facing
a very particular example of American law, although multiparty litigation
(particularly when it is based on the compulsory joinder of parties)
represents a classic and debated framework of the European civil
procedure since the origin of the common law legal rules on this topic
have been traced, at least indirectly, to Roman law. It is worth noting that
the evolution of Rule 19 eloquently emphasizes—also considering the
timeliness—the Legal Realism era that is undoubtedly the main reason for
the shift to the approach to required joinder of parties and away from
abstracted categories and conceptual references, as it was the notion (and
the automatic application) of indispensable party practice before the 1966
amendment.
Therefore, Rule 19(b) is discretionary since it shows the prevalence
of empirical criteria (obtainable from the decisions) rather than conceptual
categories. It is also discretionary because factor 19(b)(1) permits the
court to consider multiple pragmatic issues in making its Rule 19(b)
decision. The court needs to answer the question, under Rule 19(b)(1),
whether the absence of an indispensable party could be harmful not
69. See Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 427–28 (9th Cir. 1936) (“[T]he nonjoinder
of an indispensable party is fatal error, and the court cannot proceed to a decree in the absence of
such indispensable party, notwithstanding the fact that the joinder would oust the court of jurisdiction.
Neither the statute nor the equity rule, quoted above, permit the court to proceed in the absence of an
indispensable party.” (emphasis added). It is worth noting that that decision was the first attempt to
define the indispensable parties, as it follows: “There are many adjudicated cases in which expressions
are made with respect to the tests used to determine whether an absent party is a necessary party or
an indispensable party. From these authorities it appears that the absent party must be interested in
the controversy. After first determining that such party is interested in the controversy, the court must
make a determination of the following questions applied to the particular case: (1) Is the interest of
the absent party distinct and severable? (2) In the absence of such party, can the court render justice
between the parties before it? (3) Will the decree made, in the absence of such party, have no injurious
effect on the interest of such absent party? (4) Will the final determination, in the absence of such
party, be consistent with equity and good conscience? If, after the court determines that an absent
party is interested in the controversy, it finds that all of the four questions outlined above are answered
in the affirmative with respect to the absent party’s interest, then such absent party is a necessary
party. However, if any one of the four questions is answered in the negative, then the absent party is
indispensable.” Id.). It is worth noting how such determinations are translated in the current Rule
19(b), such as the guidelines merely for the court to define pragmatically the consequence of the
action brought without all the indispensable parties.
See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania 368 U.S. 71
(1961). It is worth noting that, in these cases, the decision made in absence of an indispensable party
has been considered as not only void and null but also as made in breach of the Due Process Clause
(particularly in breach of the right to be heard).
70. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 367.
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merely (or even often) for the claimant’s interest to achieve a suitable
decision, but harmful to the defendant’s interest to avoid a double liability.
Second, Rule 19 also considers the non-party’s interest to avoid pragmatic
harm from the decision rendered in her absence, even if that decision
cannot exert its binding force on her. The court’s discretionary power to
evaluate a non-party as required to be joined also considers the public
interest in reaching a stable, effective, and efficient decision, as opposed
to a hollow or contradictory adjudication that might result from multiple
litigations if the absentee were not joined.
These arguments—currently underlying a court’s Rule 19(b)
decision—grant too much discretion to the court, particularly if the
decision is examined through the lens of the civil law legal tradition. To
the contrary, a few divergent opinions—as emerged during the debate on
the 1966 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—gave rise
to different considerations.
For example, Professor Howard Fink suggested that American courts
have always decided indispensible party actions upon discretionary
factors. 71 This type of decision-making would not have avoided the
formulation of a strict rule on qualifying the parties as indispensable in
order to imperatively determine whether the action must be dismissed or
not. 72
In an attempt to reduce the discretionary power of the court, others
argued that employing the Restatement of Judgment of 1940 could have
resolved these issues. 73 The Restatement would have addressed arguments
for critically assessing as necessary or indispensable the role played by
the non-parties in the proceedings. Those arguments would have been
strictly related to the nature of the rights involved in the subject-matter of
the action brought between the original parties. In particular, reframing
the inquiry into the role played by the non-parties in the proceedings in
terms of interpretative analysis of the Restatement highlighted that the
interest of an absent party to be joined always depends on the limits posed
by the law. And this is true whenever the non-party is a co-owner of the
right involved in the action between the original parties. This specific
subjective nature of the action cannot leave to the court any discretionary

71. See Howard P. Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule
19, 74 YALE L.J. 403 (1965).
72. See id. at 410.
73. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS (AM. LAW INST. 1940).
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power to determine the consequence of the pending action because it must
be dismissed. 74
As noted above, it must not surprise the reader that references to the
old legal literature and the arguments used before the amendment of 1966
remain salient. Exploring a new comparative view and, in this way, trying
to propose a renewed evaluation of the legal framework in the United
States and in the European legal systems, we will discover the usefulness
of those references, even though American legislators neglected them in
the following acts.
III. THE COMPULSORY JOINDER OF PARTIES IN THE CIVIL LAW LEGAL
TRADITION
Why might compulsory joinder of parties under Rule 19 and, more
precisely, the notion of indispensable parties interest civil lawyers and
inspire a comparative analysis? The answer comes from Rule 19(b) as
amended in 1966. For this reason, in Part II, after first explaining the
required multiparty process within the Italian and German legal systems,
we consider whether both civil law and common law traditions can be
compared to better understand and to find better solutions in order to limit
or at least to justify the American courts’ discretionary power under Rule
19(b).
A.

Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties Within the Civil Law
Legal Systems: A Premise.

First, we introduce a general overview of the joinder of parties in the
European civil process context. Then, we proceed to analyze the specific
rules under Italian and German laws as well as the most relevant
jurisprudence and legal scholarship that these legal systems have
developed on this topic.
An introduction to the joinder of parties in European law can start
from the conceptual premise of the specific civil trial framework, due to
the rights-focused system as the prominent and essential structure of civil
proceedings. As we have already argued, “the specific legal framework
that characterizes the civil law procedural system compels us to consider
the subject matter of the lawsuit—that is, the cause of action—which is
traditionally described as an individual right recognized by the law.” 75
74. See John W. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327,
483 (1957) (noting that the prejudice is merely in fact, irrespective of the nature of the interest to be
joinder).
75. See Cavallini & Gaboardi, supra note 8 (manuscript at 13) (on file with author).
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Concentrating on the rights-focused system, instead of the remediesfocused system of common law legal systems, is the necessary premise to
appropriately compare civil law and common law, particularly when the
comparison revolves around a specific procedural issue, as in this case of
the Rule 19(b) decision.
This distinction, however, does not impede the comparison. In fact,
even acknowledging that legal remedies within common law jurisdictions
depend on judicial decisions does not mean that those legal systems do
not recognize individual rights. To the contrary, “legal systems inspired
by remedies imply that the remedies are the principal and irreplaceable
part of the individual right. This implication ultimately ensures both the
enforcement of decisions set forth by judges and compliance with the rule
of law.” 76
This methodological reminder is exceedingly relevant to the
comparison of the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties with the
aforementioned considerations of the American legal background.
One should consider the main difference, within the European legal
context, between permissive and compulsory joinder of parties. The
difference stems (not exclusively) from the specific nature of the rights
involved in the lawsuits. It mainly concerns the distinction between the
one right brought in the action by the plaintiff (characterized by a joint
co-ownership by several parties) on the one hand, and two or more
(different and autonomous) rights involved in the same proceeding
between several parties where the rights of each party are related by the
connection of each right’s title or each remedy advocated to the court) on
the other.
To be clear, whenever we discuss the compulsory joinder of parties
within the European legal context, we usually refer to the first situation
described above. The subject-matter generally involved in a compulsory
multiparty litigation is, in other words, a single right filed by the plaintiff
and characterized by a joint co-ownership of several parties. Nevertheless,
in some cases the law dictates a compulsory (and not merely permissive)
joinder of parties when the multiple claims are not equally related to the
subject matter involved in a multiparty litigation. In these cases, the
compulsory joinder of parties does not depend on the fact that two or more
parties can together claim a common, single right. Instead, in these cases
the multiparty litigation is based on different but closely related rights so
that compulsory joinder of parties depends on the need to ensure a uniform
enforcement of the decision despite the specificities of each claim. When
76.

Id. (manuscript at 15).
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the subject matter of the proceedings is a right common to all parties, the
uniformity of the decision’s enforcement is automatically ensured by the
fact that the cause in dispute is unique. On the contrary, when the subject
matter of the proceedings is a set of different, although correlated, rights,
the uniformity of the decision’s enforcement depends on whether and to
what extent the judge qualify the rights filed in the lawsuit are closely
related.
Just as in the American legal system, the traditional European legal
rules on the compulsory joinder of parties do not specify substantial
requirements, leaving legal scholarship and the courts to qualify them on
a case-by-case basis. As we will show in the next Part, Italian and German
laws only give us a limited provision on the compulsory joinder of parties.
In so doing, the European legal provisions focus on the nature and
enforcement of the decision that should be made with a compulsory
joinder of parties. They determine specific requirements of the multiparty
litigation but avoid specific guidelines to determine those indispensable
parties to be joined.
Therefore, the structural divergence of the European and American
legal systems— particularly the difference between the American
remedies-focused law and the rights-focused civil law—does not impede
a comparison of the two systems. On the other hand, a court’s
discretionary power to determine the essence of the compulsory joinder
of parties in civil litigation looks like a standard reference for both
systems. There are indeed differences in the rulings, differences in
defining the boundaries of compulsory multiparty litigation, and also
some differences in structuring the court’s decisions in the absence of an
indispensable party. However, these differences, as we will see
shortly, are not an obstacle in comparing the two systems; to the contrary,
these differences give a chance to evaluate from a new point of view some
critical but crucial aspects of each, eventually aiming to fine-tune a
prospective rule.
IV. THE COMPULSORY JOINDER OF INDISPENSABLE PARTIES IN
COMPARISON
A.

Italian Law

Italian law features a specific rule on the compulsory joinder of
parties. Article 102 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure establishes:
Where a judgment cannot be rendered but toward more parties, all of
them shall commence action or be defendants in the same action. In this
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event, if the action is commenced only by some of them or against only
some of them, the judge orders the parties who appeared before him to
call the other parties to join to proceeding by a final time limit that he
establishes. 77

This rule applies where more parties are involved in the proceedings,
and all are indispensable in this sense. Where all of the indispensable
parties have not been called to join the proceeding, the judge, also ex
officio, orders the existing parties to call the others to join as
indispensable. When this issue is raised by the Court of Appeal or even
by the Supreme Court of Cassation, the proceeding is restarted with all
required parties, because it was never judged on the merits. 78
To the contrary, if the power to shape a compulsory joinder of
indispensable parties is waived, the judge should extinguish the
proceeding. 79 The absence of all indispensable parties to the proceeding
determines the invalidity of the proceeding itself, and the judgment
eventually rendered on the merits shall not be valid against the existing
parties nor against the absentee (but indispensable) party who was not
joined.
The judgment delivered in the absence of all the indispensable parties
is considered (first by the doctrine, then by the jurisprudence) as “inutiliter
datum.” 80 This Latin idiom, that has, remarkably, existed for two millenia,
means that the same action has to be considered as never brought; in other
words, the judgment must be considered as nonexistent (even if formally
provided by res judicata) since it represents the conclusion of a void and
nonexistent proceeding.

77. See Art. 102 Codice di procedura civile [C.p.c.] (It.)., translated and reprinted in SIMONA
GROSSI & MARIA CRISTINA PAGNI, COMMENTARY ON THE ITALIAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE app.
B, at 152 (2010) (hereinafter “Italian Code”).
78. See, e.g., Cass., sez. 6, 15 marzo 2017, n. 6649, http://www.ilcaso.it/. 2017, (It.)..
79. See Italian Code, supra note 80, at 272 (“Besides the cases provided under the previous
paragraphs, and unless where the applicable law provisions provide otherwise, the proceeding
extinguishes also where the parties that shall renew the complaint, or continue the proceeding, or
reinstate, or integrate the proceeding, do not do it by the final time limit provided by the applicable
law provisions or by the judge authorized by the applicable law provisions to schedule such time limit.
When the applicable law provisions authorize the judge to schedule the time limit, this cannot be
shorter than one month and not longer than three months. The proceeding’s extinction derives
automatically from the applicable law provisions, and it may be declared by the investigating judge,
also sua sponte, or by the panel of judges, by judgment.”).
80. See GIUSEPPE CHIOVENDA, PRINCIPII DI DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE [PRINCIPLES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 1078 (2nd ed. 1965); GIORGIO COSTANTINO, CONTRIBUTO ALLO STUDIO
DEL LITISCONSORZIO NECESSARIO [CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF THE REQUIRED JOINDER OF
PARTIES] 234 (1979); SERGIO MENCHINI, IL PROCESSO LITISCONSORTILE [THE MULTIPARTY
LITIGATION] 9 (1993). See also Italian Supreme Court of Cassation no. 25454 of November 13, 2013.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss1/2

22

Cavallini and Gaboardi: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Too Discretionary

2020]

FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE TOO DISCRETIONARY

61

Accordingly, the third party who should be compulsory joined can
always autonomously bring the lawsuit she could have brought in the
multiparty litigation if she was actually joined. Indeed, ne bis in idem
principle cannot be applied to the absentee party. Ne bis in idem dictates
that a party cannot bring the same lawsuit she has already brought before
another court. But the third party who is not joined in a pending litigation
can be considered a person who has not brought her lawsuit, thereby she
is not subject to the ne bis in idem principle. For this reason, the Italian
legal rules governing the compulsory joinder of parties focuses
exclusively on the cases in which the necessary parties are absentee. The
consequence appears severe, as it is a dismissal of the action.
However, this provision must be considered a blank standard of
whatever it means to be indispensable parties.There are no specific
requirements in Italian law that should guide the judge (and, even before,
the plaintiff in bringing the action) in determining the compulsory instead
of the permissive, joinder of parties. Given this commonality with
American law, it is worth approaching a more in-depth comparative
evaluation, starting from this standpoint: the court’s discretionary power
to qualify an absent party as indispensable is a relevant and
methodological commonality between both systems.
The first element of the compulsory joinder of parties in Italian law
is traditionally considered the relation between the validity of the
judgment and the scope of the right when the plaintiff’s action was
brought in order to achieve a specific effect on the individual right filed
in the lawsuit. When the scope of the jurisdiction is to shape a new
individual right according to the multiparty right filed in the lawsuit, all
parties who are co-owners of this right must be compulsorily joined in the
proceedings. For example, when the judge is asked to declare the
unfulfilled multiparty contract invalid, the decision must be necessarily
applied to each party. 81 Otherwise, the legal system should accept that the
unfulfilled contract remains valid for the absent persons, even though the
contract has been declared as void and unenforceable towards the parties
to the proceedings. Everyone, we believe, would agree that this is an
unacceptable conclusion.
The above-mentioned example evidences that substantive and
procedural matters—individual rights and individual remedies—are
strictly interrelated in the rights-focused civil law systems. The first
element is given by the unity of the substantive situations—individual
rights—claimed in the proceedings. The second element can be described
81.

See, e.g., Cass., sez. 2, 05 maggio 2016, n. 9042, http://www.ilcaso.it/. 2016, (It.).
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as the effects that the plaintiff seeks when bringing the lawsuit in court:
these effects necessarily affect all the co-owners of the claimed right. If
the judgment does not affect all the co-owners, the plaintiff does not
obtain the outcome he demands; to obtain what the plaintiff wants, the
judgment must necessarily produce its binding effects on all the coowners. 82 So, in light of the adversarial principle and the due process right
to be heard, each co-owner must be entitled to participate in the
proceedings as an indispensable party—a party who must be joined. In
other words, if the judge does not pronounce enforceable rules towards a
plurality of subjects, the plaintiff does not obtain the outcome he demands.
The gap between the Anglo-American legal systems and the
European one—that is, the difference between the rights-focused civil law
system and the remedies-focused common law system—is reduced if we
pay attention to these arguments. Indeed, the relevance of remedies
instead of rights stems from the legal framework of the compulsory
joinder of indispensable parties when we consider the traditional criteria
guiding the judge to order the compulsory joiner of the indispensable
absentee parties.
In particular, two factors drive the discretionary qualification of
parties as indispensable . According to the rights-focused system, the first
criterion is the specific right the plaintiff asks the court to enforce: two or
more parties, in fact, must be the co-owners of that right. According to the
remedies-focused system, the second criterion derives from the fact that
the court’s evaluation of the compulsory joinder of parties must also be
related to the specific remedy asked by the plaintiff. Whenever the remedy
sought implies a substantial modification of the pre-existing rights of the
co-owners, there are no alternatives for the court: all the indispensable
parties must be compulsorily joined. Otherwise, the judge is called upon
to dismiss the action.
Essentially, the rationale of these arguments is procedural, even if it
is strongly related to the substantial nature of the involved (pre-existing)
rights. The reason is the full and necessary respect due to the procedural
right to be heard, which is a basic principle of the due process of law in
the European legal. 83 All parties are indispensable whenever the
plaintiff’s requested remedy requires an effective measure against all of
82.
83.

See, e.g., Cass., sez. 2, 03 febbraio 2017, n. 2935, http://www.ilcaso.it/ 2017, (It.).
See Art. 24 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.)., translated and reprinted in ITALIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN GLOBAL CONTEXT app. I, at 247 (Vittoria Barsotti, Paolo G. Carozza,
Marta Cartabia & Andrea Simoncini eds., 2016) (“Everyone may bring cases before a court of law in
order to protect their rights under civil and administrative law. Defense is an inviolable right at every
stage and instance of legal proceedings.”).
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them. At the same time, the order for a compulsory joinder of parties
aligns with the plaintiff’s interest to achieve a favorable decision on his
claim since such a decision can be valid and enforceable only if all parties
are entitled to discuss the case in the proceedings. In summary, the
decision is effective only if the given remedy follows the right to be heard
for all indispensable parties.
In some cases those who are entitled to claim their rights jointly
cannot demand to be joined as indispensable parties to the proceedings.
For example, in a case concerning a claim of joint liability of debtors, all
of them need not be considered indispensable parties, particularly from
the perspective of the plaintiff’s interest, to achieve a favorable decision
on his loan. 84 The creditor can obtain the full payment against one of the
debtors, thereby satisfying his interest and avoiding any risk of duplicative
litigation. In fact, this conclusion does not imply a violation of the Due
Process Clause (with respect to the right to be heard). Each debtor can be
asked to fully satisfy the creditor, so that even when a single debtor is
involved in the proceedings, the interest of the plaintiff is fully satisfied
without prejudice for the absent co-debtors who cannot be considered
indispensable parties.
In sum, Italian law recognizes a significant value in the compulsory
joinder of parties. The framework of such multiparty litigation is due to
the strict relationship between the substantial nature of the right filed in
the claim (made subjectively complex by the joint co-ownership) and the
effects on these parties of the on-going decision. The link between these
cornerstones is the respect due to the right to be heard. That justifies the
severe consequence of the end-proceeding. The compulsory dismissal of
the action, or otherwise, the invalidity of an eventual decision on the
merits is the bread and butter of the due process clause: the court’s
discretionary power to determine the constitutional need of a compulsory
joinder of parties finally seems less discretionary than what might appear
from the rule.
B.

German Law

Section 62 of the German Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter
“German Code”) provides as follows:
(1) Where the legal relationship at issue can be established vis-à-vis
all joined parties only uniformly, or where the joinder of parties is a

84.

See, e.g., Cass., sez. U, 27 luglio 2016, n. 15547, http://www.ilcaso.it/ 2016, (It.).
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necessity for other reasons, those of the joined parties who have failed to
comply with procedural rules shall be deemed to have been represented
by those who did not so fail.
(2) The joined parties who have failed to comply with procedural
rules shall continue to be involved also in the later proceedings. 85
The essence of compulsory joinder of parties within German law
turns on the necessity of a uniform judgment on the merits, whenever the
action brought by the plaintiff involves a multi-holder right. In fact, the
same notion of uniform judgment inevitably reveals the policy behind the
rule: to necessarily avoid the risk of potential contradictory judgments
(and the consequential logical and practical conflict of rei iudicatae).
However, to understand this provision, we must briefly trace the
yearslong debate found within German legal doctrine. This will create a
picture of the commonalities with Italian law and hopefully, the
usefulness in comparing and evaluating both laws with Anglo-American
legal systems.
First, German law recognizes a strict relationship between
substantial and procedural rules, which has been described as the essential
framework of the European legal tradition. Accordingly, the prominent
role assumed by the compulsory joinder of parties stems from the specific
right involved in the lawsuit. As Section 62 and the inherent doctrines
developed the so-called «Eigentlich Notwendige Streitgenossenshaft»
(actually necessary joinder of parties), in necessary multiparty litigation
highlights that the consequential decision must have the same
enforceability on all the parties. These parties are thus required to join the
proceeding as needed for just adjudication.
On this point, there is no difference from Italian law. Primarily, the
need for a multiple compulsory party litigation refers to a strict
relationship between the subject-matter of the plaintiff’s claim and the
effectiveness of the prospective adjudication, in which sense it ought to
be considered valid. Nevertheless, the German Code does not provide
consequences for failing to compulsorily join parties. 86 This enhances the
discretionary power of the judge to (1) determine when parties are
indispensable, and (2) set forth the consequence to the absentee of those
indispensable parties. Despite that, we can recognize the policies that still
85. See Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [German Code of Civil Procedure], § 62, translated at
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html
(Ger.)
[https://
https://perma.cc/S95R-NR73].
86. See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF H. STURNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 202 (2015).
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govern the compulsory joinder of parties in German law, in so finding the
similarities with Italian law, and that mainly represent the rules’ balance
of this issue within the European context of civil law.
First, the object has long been to determine when the decision must
be uniform; in other words when the right involved in the lawsuit does not
tolerate being regulated in a different way for each of the several parties.
For many years, the doctrine’s result has been, homogenously interpreting
and thinking—the need for one-size-fits-all decisions for the several
parties is founded only when any divergent decision might resolve a
practical conflict of judgments (rei iudicatae). Hence, only when the right
involved in the lawsuit is in co-ownership with several parties could it
result in different decisions, mostly considering the practical
enforceability of the judgments. 87
These considerations need clarification, however, to reveal the policy
behind the German legal rules. Given the joint co-ownership of the right
involved in the lawsuit, as the marker of the possible compulsory joinder
of all the indispensable parties, one’s attention must focus on the
consequential consideration that each party’s multiple rights—once
litigated—do not compel the plaintiff to order the necessary joinder of all
the parties for just adjudication.
It is, thus, a twofold situation that makes the compulsory joinder of
parties an excellent framework for civil procedure, driving the
discretionary power of the judge to require joinder of parties as
indispensable. First, cases of multiple rights need each co-owner of those
rights (active or passive) to be an indispensable party to the proceeding.
These cases specifically consider either a litigated situation of common
property (Gemeinschaft zur gesamten Hand—community of joint owners)
or a subject-matter involved in an action aimed at changing a pre-existing
multiple right, for example, an action pursuing a partnership winding up.
Second is an exceptional situation in the European civil justice
system where German law grants the same consequence of a compulsory
multiparty process even though the proceeding has not joined, as
indispensable parties, all the co-owners of the action. According to an old
but prominent doctrine, 88 the absence of all the indispensable parties can
87. See Friedrich Lent Die notwendige und die besondere Streitgenossenschaft, 90 JHERINGS
JARBÜCHER 27, 58 (1942); see also WOLFRAM HENCKEL, PARTEILEHRE UND STREITGEGENSTAND IM
ZIVILPROZESS 201–03 (1961). Such an interpretation can be considered a cornerstone of the
compulsory multiparty litigation in German law; see, e.g., Eberhard Wieser, Notwendige
Streitgenossenschaft, 2000 NJW, 1163, 1163–65; EBERHARD SCHILKEN, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 324–
25 (7th ed. 2014); IOANNIS MANTZOURANIS, DIE NOTWENDIGE STREITGENOSSENSCHAFT IM
ZIVILPROZESS, 144–48 (2013); CHRISTOPH G. PAULUS, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 44–46 (6th ed. 2016).
88. See MAX HACHENBURG, DIE BESONDERE STREITGENOSSENSCHAFT (1889).
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be compensated by the extension of res judicata issued only to the parties
present. It is worth noting that this doctrine, initially restricted to the
confines of the law, has progressively grown outside strictly ex lege
provisions into concrete application through recent scholarship. 89
This means the policy behind the rule is once again the purpose of
avoiding any possible conflict between judgments, and also preventing,
on the one hand, the risk of multiple litigations, and on the other hand, the
action dismissal, as the most undesirable end of the civil process.
Undoubtedly, this way of thinking and interpreting the compulsory
joinder of parties, in German law and Italian law, clearly reflects the
specific rights-focused system as it informs civil procedure rules. At the
same time it is worth emphasizing how the rights-focused system serves
the remedies-focused system in regard of the compulsory multiparty
litigation application. It also realizes the maximum result for the
combined role between substantive provisions and procedural rules.
V. COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES: IS RULE 19(B) TOO DISCRETIONARY?
It is time to turn back to American law in order to compare it to the
above-mentioned European legal systems. We first attempt to figure out
what makes sense in evaluating such different systems and rules,
specifically regarding the relevant framework of civil litigation. The
answer to this question is, however, quite easy. The comparison clearly
shows several common points between the Anglo-American legal system
and the European one, despite the structural dichotomy between the
remedies-focused system and the rights-focused system.
One might observe, primarily, that both systems assign the court the
discretionary power to imply, case-by-case, the notion of indispensable
parties, so as to order the compulsory joinder of them. Neither system
recognizes, and probably does not want to recognize, a preliminary notion
of an indispensable party. This relief stems in part from the European legal
systems and is informed by the rights-focused system. In other words, an
American legal scholar could expect, focusing on Italian and German
laws, a stricter provision on that notion, since even the strict relationship
between the action and the pre-determined right brought by plaintiff’s
claim would allow for a sort of list of situations in which the litigation
must be multiparty.
To the contrary, as noted above, the European legal systems avoid
ordering the compulsory joinder of parties in this precise sense and instead

89.

See, e.g., HENCKEL, supra note 91, at 200.
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provide a general rule. That means irrespective of any different
framework of the civil justice system as a whole,
the discretionary activity of the court is the essence of the compulsory
joinder of parties as a central and irremissible cornerstone of the civil trial
proceeding. In so recognizing, the crucial point is how this judicial
discretionary power is respectively defined and if, finally, the comparative
evaluation might suggest a sort of best rule, mutually taking specific
considerations from each system.
The question raised by this paragraph—as the title eloquently
shows—intends to softly approach a possible re-evaluation of Rule 19(b),
at least as it stands in the current debate of jurisprudence and legal
scholarship.
The first possible impact on American law that could represent the
twofold policies behind the compulsory joinder of parties’ rules highlights
the European legal system. Italian and German laws adopted similar rules,
even though they reflect different policies (but are not incompatible with
each other). While Italian law bases its compulsory multiparty
litigation’s ratio on the due process clause, as the right to be heard
between all co-owners of the specific right filed by the plaintiff’s action,
the German law focuses on the judgment’s effectiveness. As noted above,
the parties—co-owners of the right involved in the lawsuit—must be
considered indispensable, and thus compulsorily joined in the same
proceeding, even though separate and autonomous actions could
eventually deliver different decisions, which are unenforceable between
all the parties.
In sum, the European legal systems, even providing similar rules,
offers to the scholar and to the judge different perspectives, but also a
twofold guideline, to drive the discretionary power to determine the
notion of indispensable parties. It is worth noting, however, that these
different ratios, involving prima facie different policies behind each
country-specific rule, are not so different, and are surely not incompatible.
It means that, once again, a comparative evaluation must go beyond the
specific rules governing each system and try to highlight, if possible, the
commonalities of the policies behind the rule, which are the reasons that
inspired the rule-maker.
Applying this method to the compulsory joinder of parties, we reach
a conclusion. The European system of civil justice, which is structured by
a rigorous rights-focused paradigm, obviously assigns to the specific
(subjective and objective) nature of the right in the action a sort of litmus
test of the necessity or not of multiple parties in the lawsuit. In other
words, the rights-focused framework of the European legal systems gives
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meaning directly to the judge’s role in deciding how many parties have to
be compulsorily joined in the pending litigation. Accordingly, if (even
only) one of all indispensable parties is initially absent in the lawsuit, the
action will be dismissed whenever the plaintiff, once ordered by the court,
has not compulsorily added the absentee party to the proceeding.
Therefore, the rights-focused approach plays undoubtedly a vital role
in determining the discretionary power of the judge on the required
joinder of parties for its adjudication. 90 At the same time, from in-depth
perspectives of European legal scholars, that approach—even existing—
must not be overestimated. Mainly, it does not impede a useful
comparative evaluation referring to the remedies-focused legal system of
the United States, if only we consider a different methodological
approach, due to the policies beyond the rules and, to some extent, the
actual significance, in the European legal context, of the usual dichotomy
rights/remedies mentioned above.
Accordingly, the question is: might we find a common policy behind
the American legal rules and the most important European ones? The
answer must ultimately be positive, if we consider the real impact of the
rationale of Rule 19(b), as it was mentioned above. 91 The compulsory
joinder of multiple and indispensable parties seeks the same goal both in
Anglo-American legal systems and in the European ones: avoiding, if
possible, an unfortunate end to the proceeding, which is undoubtedly the
action dismissal. That is unquestionably the first common point that
embraces the two legal systems.
This common point, indeed, justifies the reasons under which, in
both systems, even ruling slightly differently, the evaluation of a party as
indispensable is inevitably a discretionary evaluation by the judge on a
case-by-case approach. On the one hand, within the American legal
system, the evaluation of the potential conflict for which the original
parties can be damaged if joined by other parties and the harm that affects
the absentee because of the final judgment can only be raised by a peculiar
knowledge of each matter in law, as it is brought to the court. It refers to
the evaluation of the judgment’s impact set forth without all the
indispensable parties. On the other hand, concerning the rights-focused
European systems and the right filed in the claim, the same evaluation of
the above-mentioned potential conflict is delegated to the judge, case-bycase. As noted above, there are, of course, some differences in ordering

90. See also Helen Hershkoff, Aggregation of Parties, Claims, and Actions, in CIVIL
LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 481, 491 (2nd ed. 2017).
91. See supra Part I.
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that kind of compulsory multiparty litigation. Nevertheless, we can
glimpse a general, but crucial commonality: whereas a couple of
principles work well for both systems as main guidelines in such a
discretionary evaluation, the judge must respect the Due Process Clause
right to be heard between all the parties and the judge should take up the
task to avoid any potential parallel proceeding risking a conflict of rei
judicatae.
The difference between Anglo-American and European legal
systems can be seen instead in the provisions of the decision-making
regarding such evaluation. The rights-focused system characterizes the
European frameworks of civil justice, in so focusing the main criteria on
evaluating the compulsory joinder of parties for just adjudication
primarily on the nature of the right involved, and consequently on the type
of decision asked by the plaintiff. Conversely, the remedies-focused
system informs the American legal framework. Moreover, it explains the
reason why Rule 19(b) explicitly focuses its attention on the “adequate
remedy” that the plaintiff still obtains “if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.” 92 Even more, the evaluation to consider a non-party as
indispensable, also reflects the remedy system in requiring the preliminary
evaluation—one that considers “appropriate judicial provisions” and
adequately avoids the prejudice of a decision “outlined in the absence of
the non-party.” 93
The starting point establishes that both systems assign the court a
discretionary power to evaluate, case by case, the necessity for
compulsory multiparty litigation. Accordingly, having recognized the
different frameworks due to the dichotomy right/remedy, it is worth
emphasizing how this dichotomy underscores each different provision as
to how the court’s discretionary power must be carried out, while both
systems once again share the same central policies behind the rules as
underlined above.
The second point is not, however, less relevant: given these premises,
one can note that the difference between the two legal systems stems from
the more discretionary power of the Anglo-American courts. To be clear,
the remedy framework creates a discretionary power to determine the
indispensable parties of an action, but at the same time aligns with the
following important consideration: “when broad discretion is desirable
(with or without factors), rule-makers should guide that discretion by
supplying general principles to assist the trial judge in making the

92.
93.

FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)(4).
See supra Part I.
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necessary normative judgments. Indeed, this fourth method—channeling
discretion through general principles—is an important adjunct to all types
of discretionary delegation.” 94 One might conclude, therefore, that those
general principles are indeed the same principles that govern the policies
behind the European rules of the civil trial with many indispensable
parties. These principles undergird both legal systems’ potential
constitutional concerns, and they serve the constitutional policies
regarding the litigation scope, irrespective of the peculiar legal
framework, regarding the right versus remedy dichotomy that usually
distinguishes the two legal systems. But these common general principles
emerge as natural principles that reflect common legal customs and
practices: they deal with the effectiveness of the adjudication as the goal
of (every) trial process—that is, being respectful of the due process clause
and “rendering complete justice with as little litigation as possible.” 95
This convergence between the Anglo-American legal systems of
compulsory multiparty litigation and the European systems rest on the
main argument: what we currently know about the American pragmatic
approach 96 to the compulsory joinder issue, as well as on the discretionary
court’s power to determine an absent party as indispensable, is manifestly
the evolution of the historical notion of the ideal lawsuit structure. Such
an evolution as it was conceived by Professor Pomeroy’s doctrine 97 and
through which the right-remedy dichotomy approach turned, until
recently, to the pragmatic approach of Rule 19(b). 98
This point deserves a particular mention, if we consider the
comparative evaluation as an additional method to understand the current
American law. It is not an accident that the features of Pomeroy’s rightremedy approach to that ideal lawsuit structure stems directly from the
debate on the multiplicity-of-suits jurisdictional doctrine.99 In fact, it is
also worth considering what Professor Robert. G. Bone wrote: “In those
cases that exhibited privity, cases involving rights or obligations shared
94. See Robert. G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 2017 (2007).
95. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 3, at 343.
96. See Bone, supra note 4, at 9 n.12 (emphasizing the notion of “pragmatic approach” that
can be defined as the “functional approach concerned primarily with evaluating practical results”).
97. See John N. Pomeroy, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 244, 259–60 (San
Francisco, A.L. Bancroft & Co. 1881). It is worth noting, for example, how Pomeroy focused on the
case by which several plaintiffs claim different primary rights without having privity connection. The
case involves “numerous owners of distinct parcels of land seeking to enjoin a common wrong that
arose for all at the same time and from the same tortious act of the defendant (for example, separate
actions to enjoin a common nuisance).”; cf. Bone, supra note 4, at 33.
98. See the in-depth historical overview offered by Bone, supra note 4, at 27–47.
99. See Note, Bills to Prevent Multiplicity of Suits, 3 VA. L. REV. 545, 546 (1916).
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group-wide, the relationship that justified consolidation involved a legal
connection among primary rights or duties that existed prior to the
dispute.” 100
Therefore, how does one not see, in Pomeroy’s doctrine, a
commonality with the (still current) legal framework of the ratios behind
the European rules on the compulsory joinder of parties? Is the one unitary
decree, 101 that decides the rights involved in the multiparty litigation, so
far from achieving the policies behind the European legal rules, as to grant
consistent decisions to each right while also respecting the Due Process
Clause’s right to be heard? The response is clearly in a sense finding a
strict similarity, above all, since it was underlined how a unitary remedy
has to fit “the rights network exactly.” 102
VI. CONCLUSION
The final question, and the conclusive evaluation, is thus to wonder
if, by the turn of the right-remedy view in the pragmatic approach, the
current Rule 19(b) makes a court’s power too discretionary when
determining indispensable parties, in so moving away from the
comparative correspondences just achieved.
In this way, we must underline what the pragmatic approach means,
primarily considering the scientific origin. It means, in short, achieving
Pound’s and Clark’s legal theories, which manifestly were the beginning
of changing civil procedure. Although it is not time to rerun those
theories, 103 it seems to us appropriate to outline the main difference
between the pragmatic approach and judicial discretion. The need to make
civil procedure more flexible has been and still is the cornerstone and the
mechanism in shifting the right-remedy approach into the new role of the
procedural rules to give efficiency to relevant facts. 104 Regarding the
multiparty litigation context, traditional judicial discretion has been the
key to understanding the pragmatic approach to the ideal lawsuit
structure, 105 and to deal with the current Rule 19(b), particularly after the
1966 amendment. From consolidating adjudication to efficient trial
100. See Bone, supra note 4, at 36.
101. Id. at 34.
102. Id. at 77. It is worth also noting that the Pomeroy’s doctrine was remedy-focused, not
rights-focused, even he devotes his attention to the primary rights network in order to prove and justify
the compulsory joinder of parties in terms of the one unitary decree (or consolidating adjudication) as
the best result in deciding primary multi-rights.
103. Id. at 80–98.
104. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 399
(1910); Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 302–03 (1938).
105. See Bone, supra note 4, at 102.
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management, the pragmatic approach privileges the case-by-case
decision, for which the court’s role should have an urgent appointment.
The comparative scenario traced above gives us a clear conclusion.
While the American pragmatic approach has also pervaded the
compulsory joinder of parties, as Rule 19(b) eloquently shows, the result
has been to increase the judge’s discretionary power in holding the absent
party indispensable. Such a result, however, leads to the sort of legal
uncertainty that reduces the actual perceived degree of predictability and
efficiency in the judicial process. In other words, judicial discretion in
assessing the indispensable party should be governed by precise criteria.
Within this context, where the indispensable party to join has become a
matter for judicial decision, the European legal rules and its policies can
offer some standard criteria to drive American courts through the case-bycase decision of the Rule 19(b) requirements. With deference to judicial
discretion as the cornerstone of the pragmatic case-by-case evaluation, we
believe that discretion should be driven by the twofold fundamental
principles which drive the European application of the law on compulsory
multiparty litigation—respect for the Due Process Clause, in terms of the
right to be heard, and the purpose to avoid separate litigations between
some (indispensable) parties. The risk for several inconsistent and
pragmatically unenforceable decisions, in other words, could represent a
breach of the due process of law, in terms of lack of effectiveness rather
than the efficiency of the trial process.
The legal framework emerging from the Italian and German legal
systems and their similar approach to the compulsory joinder of parties
suggests reframing the relevance of factors the court is asked to consider
under Rule 19(b) when it decides whether the action must proceed among
the existing parties or must be dismissed. As noted above, Rule 19(b) is
intended to afford broad opportunities for the compulsory joinder of
parties because the court has substantial discretion to decide whether to
continue the litigation without the person who should be joined or to
dismiss the action. After all, the party cannot be joined. 106 The court’s
discretion entirely depends on the factors listed in Rule 19(b). However,
these factors are considerations to be weighed by the court, because the
rule does not provide an order of importance or priority among them.
According to the cases, each factor can be considered more important than
others. Moreover, the rule does not encompass an exhaustive list of

106.

See supra Part I.A.
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factors. According to the cases, it is possible that additional factors not
listed in Rule 19(b) could also be relevant. 107
These structural features of the factors under Rule 19(b) provide a
relevant obstacle to reducing the court’s discretion and achieving legal
certainty and predictability. A remedy against the court’s excessive
discretion is to consider the factors listed in Rule 19(b) as exhaustive. This
consideration leads the court to take into account a limited number of
factors so that in a given case the court is reasonably asked to interpret
additional factors as encompassed in one of the considerations listed in
Rule 19(b). This conclusion reflects the approach to the compulsory
joinder of parties under the Italian and German legal systems. As noted
above, these legal systems tend to reduce the considerations to be weighed
by the court to (1) a given situation such as that ownership is factually and
legally common to non-parties, or (2) the absence of a person reduces the
likelihood that the court can provide justice for those already parties. 108
Another remedy against the court’s excessive discretion is to provide
an order of importance among the factors listed in Rule 19(b). For
instance, it should be appropriate for the court to give more importance to
the factor under Rule 19(b)(3) than others because the adequacy of a
judgment has maximum impact on the public interest in the efficient and
final disposition of legal disputes. A judgment must be deemed as
inadequate when the party is asked to relitigate to recover against absent
persons. Undecided claims require time and expense to relitigate them.
To the contrary, the factors under Rule 19(b)(1) and (2) should be
applied only when the adequacy test under Rule 19(b)(3) is positively
passed. The consideration of adverse consequences that may result from
proceedings without a party as well as the consideration of alternative
means of avoiding potential damages for the parties takes into account
private interests that the court should be asked to assess when the
satisfaction of public interest to adequate judgments has been ensured.
This conclusion is suggested by comparing Rule 19(b) to the Italian and
German legal systems. Indeed, the comparison has shown how the
European legal tradition tends to reduce the court’s discretion by giving
importance to public interests in determining the scope of compulsory
joinder of parties. 109 While these factors are worth maintaining in the
mentioned order of importance, the factor under Rule 19(b)(4) does not
seem essential in guiding the court’s decision. Its application requires that

107.
108.
109.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Parts III.A, III.B.
See supra Parts III.A, III.B.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021

35

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 2

74

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[54:39

the court examines whether another forum is available in which the
claimant can sue both existing parties and persons who cannot be joined.
There is no trace of this factor in the Italian and German rules. In these
legal systems, the problem is solved by making a unique forum available
when two or more parties are sued by the claimant. On the other side,
when another forum is not available to the claimant, even the U.S. courts,
in most cases, proceed with the action. 110
Finally, the aim of this comparative analysis can be described not
only as an effort to envision possible arguments in reducing the gap
between common law and civil law legal systems but also to underline—
within the fascinating topic of the compulsory joinder of indispensable
parties—an unexpected common track of the methodological approach to
the fundamentals of both systems.

110. Cf., e.g., Estate of Alvarez v. Donaldson, 213 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2000); Angst v. Royal
Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 701, 706 (3d Cir. 1996).
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